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Abstract
While it is generally agreed that perception can occur without awareness, there continues to
be debate about the type of representational content that is accessible when awareness is
minimized or eliminated. Most investigations that have addressed this issue evaluate
access to well-learned representations. Far fewer studies have evaluated whether or not
associations encountered just once prior to testing might also be accessed and influence
behavior. Here, eye movements were used to examine whether or not memory for studied
relationships is evident following the presentation of subliminal cues. Participants assigned
to experimental or control groups studied scene-face pairs and test trials evaluated implicit
and explicit memory for these pairs. Each test trial began with a subliminal scene cue, fol-
lowed by three visible studied faces. For experimental group participants, one face was the
studied associate of the scene (implicit test); for controls none were a match. Subsequently,
the display containing a match was presented to both groups, but now it was preceded by a
visible scene cue (explicit test). Eye movements were recorded and recognition memory
responses were made. Participants in the experimental group looked disproportionately at
matching faces on implicit test trials and participants from both groups looked disproportion-
ately at matching faces on explicit test trials, even when that face had not been successfully
identified as the associate. Critically, implicit memory-based viewing effects seemed not to
depend on residual awareness of subliminal scene cues, as subjective and objective mea-
sures indicated that scenes were successfully masked from view. The reported outcomes
indicate that memory for studied relationships can be expressed in eye movement behavior
without awareness.
Introduction
Historically, questions about whether or not visual information can be processed and impact
behavior in the absence of awareness have fostered considerable debate [1–3]. While there
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seems to be some agreement that subliminal perception can occur [4], questions remain about
the nature or type of representational content that is accessible absent awareness [5]. Much of
this debate has focused on the representational status of verbal materials that are presented
below subjective or objective thresholds of awareness–specifically, whether or not semantic or
conceptual representations can be recovered and influence behavior when words or digits are
presented subliminally [6–8]. For example, it has been reported that participants can name,
categorize, or otherwise respond to visible words more quickly when they are preceded by
masked semantic associates than when they are preceded by unrelated words [9] (e.g. doctor
preceded by the masked prime nurse as compared to shoe) and recent work indicates that
incongruent relationships among scene elements (e.g., a man shaving with a fork rather than a
razor) can be processed and impact subsequent responding to visible targets [10, 11].
It is noteworthy that in these examples, and others like them, associations are well-learned
by virtue of the frequency with which they are encountered together in day to day experience.
Far fewer investigations have examined whether or not memory representations for learned
episodic relationships–e.g. the link between a place and a face–might also be recovered and
impact behavior in the face of subliminal testing procedures. Therefore, the current investiga-
tion was designed to address questions about whether or not a subliminal cue might trigger
implicit memory for scene-face relationships encountered just once prior to testing. This was
addressed with two separate behavioral measures–namely, button-press responses and eye
movements. Use of eye movement measures is an important contribution, as past investiga-
tions indicate that eye movements, which permit moment-by-moment evaluation of data, are
sensitive to aspects of cognitive performance that are inaccessible to awareness and cannot be
captured by discrete button-press or verbal responses [12]. In other words, eye movements
may reveal effects of memory following subliminal scene cues when other types of behavioral
responses fail to do so.
Several research investigations indicate that eye movement measures can be used to index
remembered content [12], and collectively, results from these studies are consistent with the
view that eye movements may be an especially sensitive index of memory. For example, recent
work has shown that effects of memory on eye movement behavior are evident shortly after
display onset [13–17], occur even when memory-based viewing is counterproductive based on
task requirements [16, 18], and that eye-movement-based memory effects can be documented
in the absence of conscious awareness [19–25]. Related to this last point, it has been reported
that participants prioritize (i.e. look disproportionately at) regions of scenes that have been
manipulated at test even when they cannot explicitly describe or recognize the changes that
have been made [24, 25]. This pattern of results is provocative and suggests that awareness is
not a prerequisite for memory-based viewing. However, it is also the case that this outcome has
not always been successfully replicated [26, 27], and therefore, may not provide iron clad evi-
dence in support of the view that eye-movement-based memory effects can be documented
without concomitant awareness of retrieved content. More generally, skeptics might argue that
the methods used to assess awareness in these experiments were insufficiently sensitive. This is
because participants have typically been asked to report whether or not scenes were manipu-
lated, describing the change if one was present. Under these circumstances, participants may
opt to make conservative responses, indicating “no change” when they suspect things are dif-
ferent but lack confidence in the accuracy of their memories [28].
The use of subliminal memory cues in the current study meant that we could examine
whether or not eye movements are sensitive to memory for studied relationships when partici-
pants do not “see”, and therefore remain unaware of, the retrieval cues. Furthermore, adminis-
tration of both subjective and objective assessments of awareness subsequent to completion of
the experiment proper meant that we could confirm stimulus visibility had been successfully
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controlled. Finally, the application of a regression approach developed by Greenwald and col-
leagues [29] meant that we could evaluate the reliability of any observed implicit effects when
performance on the objective test of awareness was regressed to zero (see also [30] for a brief
summary of this method). These methodological choices were made to address some of the
criticisms that have been levied against past reports.
Consistent with the feasibility of the subliminal masking approach, a collection of studies
conducted by Henke and colleagues indicate that subliminally encoded content can sometimes
influence the speed and accuracy of judgments that are made when supraliminal test displays
are presented [31]. For example, results from two investigations have shown that when partici-
pants are asked to guess the occupational category of a person seen in a picture (i.e. “artist” or
“academic”), their responses are faster when they make guesses that are consistent with a previ-
ous subliminal study exposure [31–32]. If, for example, a face had been paired with the occupa-
tion “pianist” during subliminal encoding, then responses would be faster if participants
guessed “artist” when that face was re-presented visibly, than if they guessed “academic”. This
outcome suggests that the face-occupation association had been learned and could influence
the speed of subsequent decision making. More recently, work from the same group has indi-
cated that participants can encode shared associations across subliminally presented word
pairs [33] (see also [34–36] for subliminal learning of associative analogies). For instance, if the
word pairs bicycle-rain and rain-pen are presented subliminally during an encoding phase, and
then the pair bicycle-pen, related by virtue of the common associate rain, is presented for supra-
liminal inspection, participants are more likely to indicate that these pre-experimentally unre-
lated words are a “good fit” than if they did not share a common associate during subliminal
encoding. This outcome suggests that participants have processed each pair, and that the con-
nection across pairs has been inferred and encoded despite an absence of awareness. Collec-
tively, these experiments indicate that participants can learn novel face-occupation pairs and
word pairs despite the fact that they were presented in the context of a subliminal masking
sequence that rendered them invisible during encoding, and that the resulting memory repre-
sentations exhibit properties that characterize episodic memory (e.g., rapid encoding and rep-
resentational flexibility) [37].
Like the studies described briefly above, the current investigation addresses questions about
whether or not memory for arbitrarily paired items can be retrieved in the absence of aware-
ness. In contrast to past work, however, the encoding experience here is supraliminal and a
memory cue, meant to trigger retrieval of relational memory representations at test, is sublimi-
nal. In this case, memory expression requires not only that the subliminal cue is processed, but
that it triggers pattern completion processes mediated by the hippocampus [38] that permit
access to an associate encountered just once in combination with the cue during supraliminal
encoding. Another departure from past work concerns the use of eye movement measures to
tap expressions of memory, an approach that is integrated here with standard indices of
response time and accuracy.
Participants in this experiment were asked to commit several (visible) scene-face pairs to
memory. During a corresponding test phase, each trial began with the subliminal presentation
of a studied scene cue (i.e., a scene cue that was masked from awareness). Following the sublim-
inal scene cue, a visible 3-face display was presented and eye movements were recorded. For
participants assigned to an experimental group, one of the faces was the studied associate of
the scene cue; for control group participants, the associate was not present in the display.
Regardless of group assignment, participants were instructed to select the face they felt was
likely to be the studied associate of an upcoming visible scene cue, and they were told that this
task was a measure of foresight. Use of this first test display meant that we could evaluate eye-
movement-based and behavioral measures of implicit memory. Subsequent to the implicit test,
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the same 3-face display was presented again, but now it was preceded by the visible scene. In
this case, the studied associate was present regardless of group assignment and participants
were instructed to select that face from the alternatives while their eye movements were being
recorded. Viewing patterns and behavioral responses to this display were used to assess explicit
memory for the studied scene-face relationships.
As reported in past work [13, 15, 16, 39, 40, 41], we expected that eye movements would be
allocated disproportionately to faces that had been paired with specific scene contexts, but here
these viewing effects were expected even when the scene cues, meant to trigger memory for
studied relationships, were presented subliminally. Specific predictions about the time-course
of memory-based viewing to implicit and explicit test displays are outlined below (in the meth-
ods section), following a detailed description of the procedures that were used to analyze the
eye movement data. Consistent with results reported by Henke and colleagues [32, 36], it was
predicted that participants assigned to the experimental group would respond more quickly
when associates were identified correctly (vs. not) following subliminal scene cues, which
would indicate that the speed of decision making was influenced by retrieved relationships. It
was also possible that presentation of the subliminal scene cue would drive response selection
accuracy among experimental group participants–i.e., that the associate would be selected
more often than chance. On the other hand, and as described in the discussion section, button-
press responses may prove insensitive to memory in the face of subliminal stimulus presenta-
tions; for that reason evaluation of the eye movement record was considered particularly
important. Ultimately, any evidence for memory in button-press responses and/or the eye
movement record would complement and extend past work using subliminal encoding proce-
dures, and would provide additional evidence in support of the view that episodic memory rep-
resentations can be accessed and expressed even in the absence of awareness.
Methods
Participants
Forty students from the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee completed this experiment and
were compensated with course credit. After providing written informed consent in a manner
approved by the Institutional Review Board at UWM, participants were randomly assigned to
either an experimental group (N = 20) or a control group (N = 20). Data obtained from one
participant assigned to the experimental group were dropped from reported analyses because
explicit recognition performance was more than two standard deviations below the group
mean and not better than chance. Therefore, all of the reported analyses were based on data
obtained from 39 participants, 19 assigned to the experimental group and 20 assigned to the
control group. Seven additional participants were dismissed before testing commenced because
successful calibration could not be achieved. All of the procedures for this experiment were
approved by the local Institutional Review Board at UWM.
Materials
One hundred sixty-eight gray-scale scenes were selected for the current study based on the out-
come of a norming experiment. Half of these pictures were indoor scenes (e.g., dentist office)
and the remainders were outdoor scenes (e.g., Millennium Park). The norming experiment
was conducted to ensure that each scene could be successfully masked from view when it was
presented subliminally in the experiment proper.
For norming purposes, each scene was systematically degraded in a process that yielded a
set of nine additional exemplars. To produce each set, a gray layer (R: 115, B: 113, G: 113) was
superimposed on top of the original scene and the opacity of this layer was repeatedly increased
Subliminal Relational Memory
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by 10% so that the visibility of the picture underneath was systematically reduced (see Fig 1).
Resulting images were embedded in a subliminal masking sequence [31] to determine which
version of each picture would be carried forward for use in the primary investigation. Among
the subset of scenes that was selected, the maximum level of required degradation was 70%.
Ultimately, 96 scenes in the final set were successfully masked from view during norming with-
out any degradation. Remaining scenes had superimposed gray-scale layers with opacities set
to 10 (15 pictures), 20 (10 pictures), 30 (9 pictures), 40 (8 pictures), 50 (11 pictures), 60 (14 pic-
tures), or 70 (5 pictures) percent, respectively (see S1 Supplementary Materials for more infor-
mation about the norming procedure).
Fig 1. Scene Degradation. Illustration of the approach that was used to systematically degrade scenes that
were presented in the subliminal masking sequences. A gray layer (R: 115, B: 113, G: 113) was superimposed
on top of each scene. The opacity of this layer was then systematically increased to produce a set of nine
additional scene exemplars that were used in a norming experiment. Scenes carried forward for use in the
experiment proper were selected based on the outcome of the norming investigation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141677.g001
Subliminal Relational Memory
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In addition to the final set of scenes, 168 gray-scale faces (half male, remainder female) were
selected from an established faces database [16] and forty-two black and white visual noise
images were used as masks when scenes were presented subliminally [32].
The total screen resolution was set to 800x600 pixels. Scenes and masks were presented cen-
trally, and were sized to 600x450 pixels; faces were 210 pixels square and were superimposed
on a 225x225 pixel gray background. When scenes were presented side by side during the
2-alternative forced-choice awareness assessment they were sized to 300x225 pixels.
Apparatus
Eye position was recorded every 17ms (i.e., at a sampling rate of 60 Hz) with an Applied Sci-
ence Laboratories D6 remote eye tracker (Applied Science Laboratories, Bedford, MA). This
eye tracking system illuminates the eye with infrared light and records changes in the angle
between the pupil and the corneal reflection as the eyes move. Head movement in all three
dimensions was recorded using a head tracking system and head position was integrated with
eye position to permit reliable acquisition of data that reflects gaze coordinates. Event timing
was controlled with Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Berkeley, CA) and sti-
muli were viewed on an ASUS LCDmonitor with a 60 Hz refresh rate.
Design and Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were seated at a distance approximately 25 inches
from the computer monitor and task instructions were provided. Following a brief practice ses-
sion, participants had an opportunity to ask any remaining questions and then eye position was
calibrated using a 3 x 3 spatial array, a process that was repeated prior to each experimental
block. As in previous studies [13–16], elements in the array (i.e. the letters A through I) were
positioned in three equally spaced rows and columns across the screen, covering the bounds of
our stimulus displays. Participants were asked to fixate each letter in turn, eye position was
recorded, and then the alignment of fixations with calibration points was checked by the experi-
menter. If fixations did not fall on the calibration points, the process was repeated.
Individual encoding blocks were followed by corresponding test blocks; altogether, three
encoding-test block sequences were completed by each participant. During each encoding
block, participants were presented with 56 trial-unique scene-face pairs and were instructed to
commit each pair to memory. Individual trials were experimenter-initiated contingent upon
participants fixating a centrally-located black circle. When the trial advanced, a scene was pre-
sented for 2 seconds, and then a face was superimposed on top of the scene for 5 seconds. Fol-
lowing the presentation of each pair, participants made a button press to indicate whether or
not they felt there was a good fit between the person and the place depicted by the scene
(1 = Terrible Fit, 2 = Poor Fit, 3 = Good Fit, 4 = Excellent Fit); a time limit was not applied to
this judgment, which was meant to encourage deep encoding of each pair (see Fig 2).
Fourteen trials were presented in each test block and were experimenter-initiated contin-
gent upon participants fixating a centrally-located black circle. Each trial began with the sub-
liminal presentation of a studied scene (described below) and was followed by the presentation
of a visible 3-face display, which remained in view for 5 seconds and was used to evaluate
implicit retrieval of the studied scene-face relationship. All three faces in this display had been
seen during the corresponding encoding block and participants were asked to select the face
that they expected would be the associate of an upcoming visible scene cue. Participants were
told that this was a measure of foresight, a cover story that permitted us to obtain behavioral
responses to 3-face displays preceded by subliminal scene cues (i.e., a behavioral measure of
implicit memory). Immediately thereafter, a visible scene cue was presented for 2 seconds.
Subliminal Relational Memory
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Finally, the same 3-face display was re-presented, superimposed on top of the scene for 5 sec-
onds; this display was used to evaluate explicit retrieval of the scene-face relationship. At this
point, participants were instructed to indicate which face had been paired with the scene during
the encoding phase (i.e., a behavioral measure of explicit memory) by making a button press.
Finally, participants were asked to indicate how confident they were in the accuracy of their
explicit recognition response (1 = high confidence, 2 = low confidence, 3 = guess; see Fig 2).
Participants were not told about the presence of the scene in the masking sequence; instead,
they were instructed to perform an attention task, which was used to minimize any potential
differences in the distribution of attention across the visual display. Successful performance of
Fig 2. Encoding and Retrieval Trials. (top) Scenes were presented alone for 2 seconds at the start of each encoding trial. A face was then superimposed
on the scene for 5 seconds and participants were instructed to indicate whether the pair was a good fit using a scale from 1–4. There was no time limit
imposed on the judgment. (bottom) Each test trial began with the subliminal presentation of a studied scene. The scene was embedded in a masking
sequence and participants were instructed to perform an attention task–making a button press when a visible fixation cross was replaced with a vertical or
horizontal line segment. The masking sequence shown here was repeated six times, which meant that the scene was presented twelve times in 6 seconds.
Following subliminal presentation of the scene, a visible three-face display was presented for 5 seconds and was used to test memory implicitly. At the end of
the trial, a visible scene cue (2 seconds) preceded presentation of the same 3-face test display (5 seconds), which was used to test memory explicitly.
Controls were yoked to experimental participants so that all of the trial events were the same with the exception of the subliminal scene cue, for which there
was not an associate in the corresponding implicit test display.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141677.g002
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this task required participants to direct attention to a centrally-located fixation cross, and to
make a button press when the cross was replaced with a horizontally- or vertically-oriented
line segment. To conceal the purpose of the masking sequence, participants were told that the
task was simply meant to index attention. The masking technique developed by Henke and col-
leagues [32] was used to present the scene cue subliminally at the start of each test trial. Using
this technique, each scene cue was presented twelve times in 6 seconds, flanked by visual noise
masks. Presentation durations were 17ms for the scene (S), 183ms for masks (M), and 233ms
for the fixation crosses/line segments (F). The subliminal presentation of one scene was given
in the following sequence F-M-S-M-M-S-M-F-M-S-M-M-S-M-F-M-S-M-M-S-M-F-M-S-M-
M-S-M-F-M-S-M-M-S-M-F-M-S-M-M-S-M and the fixation cross (F) was replaced randomly
with a horizontal or vertical line segment once per trial.
As indicated above, participants were randomly assigned to an experimental group or a con-
trol group prior to testing. For participants in the experimental group, the subliminal scene cue
was the studied associate of one of the faces in the corresponding 3-face display. Participants
assigned to the control group were presented with the same 3-face displays (i.e. each control
group participant was yoked to an experimental group participant), but the subliminal cue was
a different studied scene for which there was not a match. Yoked participants assigned to the
experimental and control groups were presented with the same visible scene cue, which always
had a match (i.e. a face with which it had been studied) in the 3-face display presented at the
end of the test trial (see Fig 2).
The above scheme meant that participants assigned to the experimental group were pre-
sented with 14 scene cues in each test block–i.e. the same scene was presented subliminally and
supraliminally, and this scene was the studied associate of one of the faces in each of the corre-
sponding 3-face displays. In contrast, participants assigned to the control group were presented
with 28 scene cues in each test block–i.e. 14 subliminal scenes for which there was not a match
in the corresponding 3-face display and 14 different supraliminal scenes for which there was a
match. Across trials, the critical face (i.e. the studied associate of subliminal scene cues for the
experimental group, and the same face absent the association for the control group) appeared
equally often in every spatial location (i.e., left, right, or bottom). Altogether, participants com-
pleted 42 test trials in this experiment.
Upon completion of the experiment proper, participants provided responses to a short
post-test questionnaire similar to one that has been used previously by Henke and colleagues
[32]. This questionnaire was used to determine whether or not participants had suspicions
about the purpose of the masking sequence or had noticed any regularity in the visual noise
images while they were performing the attention task. After responses to these initial questions
were obtained, the purpose of the masking sequence was revealed and participants answered
several additional questions (e.g., Now that you know about the presence of the scene, do you
feel that you may have been aware of it on some of the trials?). Responses to these questions
provided a subjective measure of scene perception and recognition.
Subsequent to questionnaire administration, all of the participants completed a more objec-
tive test of awareness. Prior to administration of this test, participants were told that a masking
sequence, identical to the one used previously, would be presented, but now they were aware
that a scene was embedded among the visual noise images. With this in mind, they were asked
to identify that scene from two alternatives following presentation of the visual noise display.
As in the experiment proper, participants performed the attention task while the masking
sequence was in view (see Fig 3).
The forced-choice awareness test was subdivided into three blocks of 14 trials (42 trials alto-
gether, as in the primary experiment). Scenes from pairs that had been encoded, but had not
appeared in the test phase, served as the materials for this phase of the experiment. Use of
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encoded scenes was important because it is possible that pictures embedded among visual
noise masks are more easily perceived and/or identified when they have been seen previously.
All of the scenes were presented in reverse order relative to when they had been encoded
(scenes encoded more recently were presented in the first block of the awareness test and those
encoded more remotely were presented in the final block of the awareness test). This approach
meant that we could examine whether or not successful recognition of subliminally presented
scenes was affected by the amount of time that had passed since encoding. Each two-alternative
forced-choice display remained in view for 5 seconds and participants made a button press to
identify the scene that they felt had been presented in the corresponding masking sequence.
Across trials, the masked “target” scene appeared equally often to the left and right of fixation.
Counterbalancing
For counterbalancing purposes, individual scenes were randomly assigned to one of 12 lists (14
scenes per list), each with equal numbers of indoor and outdoor exemplars. Faces were also
assigned to one of 12 lists (14 faces per list), each with an equal number of male and female
exemplars. For each participant, a given list of scenes was then paired with a given list of faces.
Individual scenes and faces from corresponding lists were presented as pairs during the encod-
ing phase. One-quarter of the encoded scenes and three quarters of the encoded faces were
used to construct retrieval trials for the experimental group. Half of the encoded scenes and
three quarters of the encoded faces were used to construct retrieval trials for the control group.
The remaining scenes, those that were not presented in retrieval trials for either group, were
used in the objective awareness test. Lists of scenes and faces rotated across experimental con-
ditions and blocks, and faces from each list rotated across “face types” in the 3-face displays.
Because there were two foil faces for every critical face in a given display, this meant that each
individual face exemplar was presented more often as a foil than as a critical face across partici-
pants. This is important because it meant that perceptual factors (e.g. the physical appearance
of a particular face) could not confound any of the observed memory effects. In other words,
any bias toward a small subset of faces based on perceptual characteristics would work against
us because, across participants, each face was overrepresented as a foil.
Eye Movement Analyses
As in past work (see [12] for review), fixations were defined by successively recorded samples
with gaze position changes less than 1° of visual angle that, when combined, had a minimum
Fig 3. Objective Test of Scene Awareness. Individual trials began with the subliminal presentation of a studied scene. Participants were told that scenes
were embedded in the masking sequences and were asked to select that scene from two alternatives presented for 5 seconds at the end of the trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141677.g003
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duration of 100ms. Individual fixations were then assigned to a given region of interest–i.e. one
of the three faces (with a bounding box that incorporated the black background on which faces
were superimposed) or the remainder of the screen. Off screen fixations were eliminated from
further analysis.
Two classes of eye movement measures were used to evaluate the impact of memory on pat-
terns of viewing. Global measures were calculated based on proportion of total viewing time
directed to specific faces of interest collapsed across the duration of the entire test trial, whereas
time-course measures, which provide more precise information about how viewing unfolds
over the course of a test trial, were calculated after the data had been subdivided into consecu-
tive 250ms time bins. A time-course analysis was performed because past work has shown that
global measures do not always reveal effects of memory [16]. For the time-course analysis, data
from the first 2 seconds following 3-face display onset were considered. Analyses were limited
to early viewing because past work shows that memory-based viewing effects are most robust
shortly after test display onset [13, 14, 16, 18] and the 2000ms cutoff has been used in past
work with the same basic paradigm [16].
Eye position was frequently unreliable immediately after the subliminal masking sequence
was presented because pupil size was affected by the flashing checkerboard display. Therefore,
data from the first time bin (0–250ms) were dropped from all of the reported statistical tests.
Displays for which eye movement data were lost or unreliable (i.e. total viewing time less than
65% the display duration) were also dropped from reported analyses [14]. Using this approach,
average elimination was 7 or 8 trials per subject for implicit and explicit test displays, respec-
tively. Participants with an insufficient number of remaining trials in a bin of interest (i.e.
fewer than 4) [14] were eliminated from reported contrasts. When this occurs, it is noted in the
text. In the paragraphs that follow, more specific information about how data were analyzed
for the implicit and explicit test displays is provided along with corresponding predictions.
Implicit Test (following subliminal scene cues): Individual implicit test displays were subdi-
vided into two types based on button press responses that were made by the participants: 1) tri-
als characterized by selection of the critical face, and 2) trials characterized by selection of a foil
face. When a foil was selected, the remaining two faces in the display (i.e. the critical face and
the second foil) were also used in reported analyses. This meant that there were four “faces of
interest”: 1) selected critical faces, selected foils, critical faces not selected, and foils not selected.
Based on past work with this paradigm [16], we know that viewing is affected by two factors: 1)
the act of selection, and 2) memory for scene-face relationships. Selected faces tend to be priori-
tized over faces that are not selected, and associates tend to be prioritized over foils.
There are two ways to document memory-based viewing effects after equating for selection
history–namely, greater viewing of selected associates than selected foils, and greater viewing
of associates that were not selected than foils that were not selected. Use of all three faces from
a given test display (i.e. when a foil face has been selected) in reported comparisons might
appear problematic because viewing directed to one face necessarily detracts from the remain-
ing two. Critically though, it is also the case that if memory has no impact on eye movement
behavior, residual viewing (regardless of time spent on the selected foil) should be equally dis-
tributed among the other two faces in the display (i.e. the associate and the remaining foil); in
the absence of a memory-based contribution, there is no reason to prioritize the associate.
Comparisons among face types were performed using global measures (collapsed across the
entire test trial) and time-course measures as described in the preceding section. Relative to
corresponding foils, it was predicted that experimental group participants would show dispro-
portionate viewing of critical faces that were not selected within 1000–2000ms of 3-face display
onset [15], and that disproportionate viewing of selected critical faces would occur earlier (e.g.,
within 500–750ms of display onset; 14–16). Controls were expected to show effects of selection,
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but were not expected to prioritize critical faces over corresponding foils because, for this
group, the critical face had not been paired with the subliminal scene cue during encoding. In
addition, it was considered unlikely that effects of memory would be evident in global viewing
measures, as these are not sensitive to transient effects of memory [16].
Explicit Test (following visible scene cues): The same basic approach was used to examine
viewing directed to explicit test displays, but now scene cues were visible, and critical faces
were associates of the scene cues for both groups of participants. As above, individual trials
were subdivided into two types–those characterized by correct identification of the critical face
(i.e. the associate) and those characterized by incorrect identification of a foil as the associate.
Effects of selection and memory were evaluated as described above. Consistent with past work
[16, 41], disproportionate viewing of correctly identified associates (relative to foils selected in
error) was expected shortly after display onset (i.e. within 500–750ms of 3-face display presen-
tation) for both groups. Disproportionate viewing of non-selected associates was expected to
emerge later in time, and would suggest an influence of memory in the absence of conscious
awareness. However, this evidence might be considered less compelling than results from the
implicit test because the possibility remains that participants simply pressed the wrong button,
or realized that their response was incorrect, but failed to rectify the error. Finally, in the pres-
ence of visible scene cues and explicit retrieval instructions, memory-based viewing effects
were expected to be longer lasting, and might therefore be evident in global measures as well.
Statistical Contrasts
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was calculated for all of the reported ANOVAs with more than one
degree of freedom in the numerator. In the event that sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-
Geisser adjusted degrees of freedom, p-values, and corresponding epsilons (G-G ε) were
reported. Post-hoc statistical tests were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons, and
Cohen’s d was calculated as a measure of effect size using means and standard deviations from
each group.
Results
Behavioral (Button-Press) Performance
Attention Task. Results indicated that participants complied with attention task instruc-
tions, as they failed to make responses on just 5.19% (SD = 12.24) of the test trials. For the
remaining trials, successful detection/identification of horizontal or vertical line segments
embedded in the subliminal masking sequence was high and well-matched across groups
(Experimental Group: 82.61% correct, SD = 16.60; Control Group: 83.78% correct, SD = 21.58;
t(37) = .08, p = .94; Cohen’s d = .03). This outcome indicates that the allocation of attention to
subliminal scene cues during test trials was comparable among experimental and control
group participants.
Implicit Memory for Scene-Face Relationships. Based on previous reports [30], mem-
ory-based differences in decision making and/or response time were predicted for experimental
group participants. Specifically, it was expected that following presentation of the subliminal
scene cue these participants might select critical faces more often than would be expected by
chance, or that their responses might be made more quickly when critical faces happened to
have been selected versus not. The same outcomes were not expected for controls, as there was
not a learned relationship between subliminal scene cues and critical faces embedded in 3-face
displays for this group (see Fig 2).
Initial evaluation of the behavioral data indicated that participants failed to make responses
on 3.11% (SD = 5.81) of the trials. After discarding this small subset of the data, it was
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determined that neither group selected critical faces more often than would be expected by
chance (Experimental Group: 34.77% selection, SD = 5.99%, t(18) = 1.29, p = .11; Control
Group: 34.83% selection, SD = 7.55, t(19) = 1.09, p = .14), and there were no differences in the
rate with which critical faces were selected across groups (t(37) = .01, p = .99; Cohen’s d = 0).
In sum, there was no evidence for any influence of scene-face memory on experimental group
performance following presentation of the subliminal scene cue.
To determine whether or not there were response time differences between groups when
the critical face happened to have been selected (vs. not), a between-groups repeated-measures
ANOVA was calculated with the factors group (experimental vs. control) and trial type (critical
face selected vs. critical face not selected). In contrast to our predictions, the amount of time
required to select a face was not influenced by whether or not that face happened to have been
the studied associated of the subliminal scene cue. Results indicated that response times were
numerically longer for controls than for participants assigned to the experimental group, but
these differences were not statistically significant (F(1,37) = 2.65, p = .12). More important for
our purposes, there were no response time differences as a function of trial type (F(1,37) = .03,
p = .87), nor was there a statistically significant group by trial type interaction (F(1,37) = .59,
p = .45; see Table 1). Therefore, results reported in past work [31, 32] were not replicated in
these initial contrasts.
Explicit Memory for Scene-Face Relationships. Explicit memory for scene-face relation-
ships was tested with 3-face displays presented subsequent to visible scene cues. In this case,
the scene cue was the studied associate of the critical face for participants assigned to both
groups. Here, participants were instructed to identify that face from among the three alterna-
tives and it was predicted that there would be no differences between groups in accuracy or
response time.
Participants failed to make responses on 3.85% (SD = 6.22) of the explicit test trials, and
evaluation of explicit recognition performance on the remaining trials confirmed our predic-
tions. Recognition memory accuracy was reliably above chance for both groups (Experimental
Group: 75.92% correct, SD = 16.14, t(18) = 11.59, p<. 001; Control Group: 83.33% correct,
SD = 10.81, t(19) = 21.20, p<. 001), and there was not a between-groups difference in perfor-
mance (t(37) = 1.66, p = .11; Cohen’s d = .52).
A repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors group (experimental vs. control) and accu-
racy (associate correctly identified vs. associate not identified) indicated that response times
were also well-matched across groups (F(1,28) = 0.89, p = .35), and that group assignment did
not interact with trial type (F(1,28) = .75, p = .39). There was, however, a main effect of recog-
nition accuracy–responses were made more quickly when the associate was correctly identified
than when one of the foil faces was selected in error (F(1,28) = 109.93, p< .001; see Table 1).
Note that 9 participants were excluded from this analysis because they failed to meet the 4 trial
bin size criterion for incorrect responses. However, when the bin size requirement was omitted,
Table 1. Response Time (ms) Associated with Face Selection Following 3-Face Display Onset.
Experimental Group Control Group
Critical Face Selected Foil Face Selected Critical Face Selected Foil Face Selected
Implicit Test 2466.03 (731.77) 2490.88 (810.75) 2838.81 (618.82) 2799.86 (468.84)
Explicit Test 2113.99 (484.42) 2900.26 (686.19) 2232.04 (405.64) 3140.85 (491.84)
Back-Sorted 2440.37 (679.20) 2488.90 (801.07) 2812.90 (604.22) 2760.10 (481.19)
Standard deviations of the mean are in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141677.t001
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and just one participant was eliminated because no incorrect responses were made, the statisti-
cal outcomes remained the same. There were no group differences in response time (F(1,36) =
.31, p = .58), nor was there a statistically reliable interaction (F(1,36) = .19, p = .66), but
participants made faster responses when the associate was correctly identified (F(1,36) = 98.25,
p< .001).
Subsequent Memory Analyses. To account for the possibility that participants may have
failed to encode some of the studied pairs, implicit behavioral data were back-sorted as a func-
tion of response accuracy on the explicit recognition test. Here, data analysis was limited to the
subset of implicit trials for which participants successfully identified the associate on the corre-
sponding test of explicit memory. This approach was used to determine whether or not implicit
memory effects might be evident for the subset of scene-face pairs that had been learned during
encoding.
When analyses were limited to successfully recognized pairs, participants assigned to the
experimental group selected critical faces more often than would be expected by chance from
the initial 3-face test display (40.15% selection, SD = 13.75%, t(18) = 2.50, p = .02). This result
suggests an influence of memory for scene-face pairs on the selection process following presen-
tation of subliminal scene cues. However, the same effect was marginal among control group
participants (36.25% selection, SD = 8.52, t(19) = 1.91, p = .07), and a direct comparison indi-
cated that the frequency with which critical faces were selected was not reliably different across
groups (t(37) = 1.07, p = .29; Cohen’s d = .33). Because the presence of a trend toward greater
selection of critical faces among controls was unanticipated, exploratory analyses were con-
ducted to determine whether observed outcomes might be related to some sort of behavioral
response bias. As is reported in the S1 Supplementary Materials, perceptual and location-based
factors were ruled out, but results did reveal a subtle tendency for participants in both groups
to select the same face from corresponding implicit and explicit test displays. This observation
is notable because when analyses are back-sorted based on explicit recognition accuracy, and
there is a bias towards repeated choices, correct implicit recognition responses may be artifi-
cially inflated. Consequently, it cannot be said with certainty that the above-chance selection of
critical faces among experimental group participants reflects memory. As above, results from a
repeated measures ANOVA with the factors group (experimental vs. control) and trial type
(critical face selected, critical face not selected) did not provide evidence in support of predicted
response time differences (all F’s(1,36)2.27, p’s.14; see Table 1). One participant was elimi-
nated from this response time analysis because there were fewer than four incorrect trials
remaining in the back-sorted data set.
Eye Movements
Implicit Memory for Scene-Face Relationships. Global Measures: There were no
differences in the proportion of total viewing time directed to critical faces (selected or not) rel-
ative to corresponding matched comparison faces for either group (Experimental Group: t’s
(18) .31, p’s .76; Control Group: t’s(19) .80, p’s .44). A between-groups repeated mea-
sures ANOVA with the factors face type (critical face, comparison foil face) and selection his-
tory (selected, not selected) indicated that more time was spent viewing faces that happened to
have been selected vs. not (F(1,37) = 101.24, p< .001), but none of the remaining main effects
or interactions were statistically reliable (all F’s .52, p’s .48; see Fig 4A). This outcome was
not unexpected, as previous work indicates that memory-based viewing effects may be espe-
cially robust soon after test display onset, and can be obscured when data are collapsed across
the entire duration of a test display (cf. Hannula et al., 2007). Time-course measures, described
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next, were used to determine whether or not there were differences early in viewing that distin-
guished studied associates from corresponding matched comparison faces.
Time-Course Measures: A between-groups repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors
group (experimental, control), face type (critical face, comparison foil face), selection history
(selected, not selected), and time bin (250–500 . . . 1750–2000) was calculated. Proportion of
viewing time was well matched across groups (F(1,37) = .05, p = .83) and first-level interactions
of face type, selection history, and time bin with group status were not statistically reliable (all
Fig 4. Implicit Memory-Based Viewing Effects. A) Proportion of total viewing time directed to faces of interest collapsed across the duration of the entire
test trial for the experimental group (top) and the control group (bottom). More time was spent looking at faces that happened to have been selected, but there
were no effects of memory in viewing patterns. B) Proportion of total viewing time direct to faces of interest broken down into 250ms time bins starting with
3-face display onset. Faces that happened to have been selected were prioritized, but effects of memory on the viewing behavior of experimental group
participants (top) are also evident; the same effects are absent from control data (bottom). Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141677.g004
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F's.72, p's.43). As reported for global viewing time measures, more time was spent looking
at faces that were selected (main effect of selection history: (F(1,37) = 105.86, p< .001). In
addition, the distribution of viewing changed over time (main effect of time bin: (F(2.75,
101.88) = 5.11, p = .003; G-G ε = .46) and the effect of selection on eye movement behavior
became increasingly robust with time (selection history x time bin interaction: F(2.33, 86.32) =
4.21, p = 0.01; G-G ε = .39). While there was not a main effect of face type (F(1,37) = .11, p =
.74), there was a statistically reliable 3-way interaction of face type, time bin, and group assign-
ment (F(3.35, 123.98) = 3.31, p = .02; G-G ε = .56) as well as a statistically reliable 4-way inter-
action of face type, selection history, time bin, and group assignment (F(4.03, 149.05) = 2.42,
p = .05; G-G ε = .67). As can be seen in Fig 4B, these results seem to reflect the influence of
memory for scene-face relationships on patterns of viewing among experimental, but not con-
trol group participants. The absence of a memory effect among control group participants is
not surprising as there was not a studied associate of the subliminal scene cue in the corre-
sponding 3-face display.
Two separate ANOVAs–one that compared viewing behavior directed to faces that were not
selected (i.e. non-selected critical faces and non-selected foils), and a second one that compared
viewing directed to selected faces (i.e. selected critical faces and selected foils)–were calculated to
unpack the 4-way interaction, and to evaluate memory-based viewing effects absent overarching
effects of selection history. The 3-way interaction of face type (critical, foil), time bin (250–500
. . . 1750–2000), and group was statistically reliable when comparisons were based on data from
faces that had not been selected (F(4.35,160.84) = 4.24, p = .002, G-G ε = .72); the same interac-
tion for selected faces was not significant (F(3.28, 121.24) = 1.90, p = .13, G-G ε = .55).
To determine when in time memory had an impact on eye movement behavior post-hoc
comparisons were performed for each group separately at individual time points starting with
the 250–500ms time bin. These comparisons were corrected for the number of time bins that
were evaluated (i.e., 7 time bins within 250–2000ms of display onset). Despite the absence of a
significant 3-way interaction, initial comparisons examined whether or not memory-based
viewing effects distinguished selected critical faces from corresponding foils. In this case, stan-
dard memory-based viewing effects were not found; instead, the only statistically reliable out-
come was a disproportionate viewing effect greater for selected foils than for selected critical
faces from 250–500ms among participants assigned to the experimental group (t(18) = 3.66,
Bonferroni corrected p = .01). As predicted, subsequent comparisons performed on data
obtained from participants assigned to the experimental group were consistent with memory-
based viewing time predictions. More time was spent viewing critical faces that had not been
selected than corresponding foils (also not selected) from 1500–2000ms after display onset (t’s
(18)3.04, Bonferroni corrected p's.05; see Fig 4B). This outcome reflects memory for stud-
ied scene-face pairs despite the use of a subliminal scene cue, and therefore provides evidence
for the implicit expression of eye-movement-based relational memory effects. When the same
comparisons were performed for the control group, there were no differences in patterns of
viewing directed to critical faces relative to other selected or non-selected foil faces in the 3-face
displays (all p's>.19); this outcome was expected, as the studied associate was not present in
the implicit test display for control group participants (see Fig 4B). One final analysis, reported
in the S1 Supplementary Materials, replicated these outcomes when a direct comparison of crit-
ical face viewing (without consideration of corresponding foils) was performed across groups.
Explicit Memory for Scene-Face Relationships. Global Measures: Standard memory-
based viewing effects, calculated (as for explicit RT analyses) after having eliminated 9 partici-
pants for whom there were fewer than 4 incorrect responses, were evident when explicit mem-
ory for scene-face pairs was tested. As above, a between-groups repeated measures ANOVA
confirmed a main effect of selection history (F(1,28) = 377.22, p< .001)–participants spent
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more time viewing faces that were selected as compared to those that were not–and this effect
was especially robust among experimental group participants (selection history x group inter-
action: F(1,28) = 8.85, p = .006). Most important for our purposes, and in contrast to implicit
memory results reported above, there was also a main effect of face type (F(1,28) = 45.76, p<
.001). Follow-up comparisons indicated that participants from both groups spent more time
looking at correctly identified associates than at foil faces selected in error (Experimental
Group: t(15) = 3.88, p = .001; Control Group: t(13) = 4.07, p = .001). Notably, these memory-
based viewing effects were also statistically reliable when comparison were made between asso-
ciates and foils that had not been selected (Experimental Group: t(15) = 2.70, p = .02; Control
Group: t(13) = 3.65, p = .003; see Fig 5A). This outcome indicates that eye movements were
sensitive to studied scene-face relationships even when explicit recognition responses were
incorrect. Next we examine how soon after display onset these memory-based differences in
the distribution of viewing occurred.
Time-Course Measures: A between-groups repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors
group (experimental, control), face type (associate, comparison foil face), selection history
(selected, not selected), and time bin (250–500 . . . 1750–2000) was calculated. Proportion of
viewing time was well matched across groups (F(1,28) = 1.24, p = .28) and first-level interactions
of face type, selection history, and time bin with group status were not statistically reliable (all
F's.1.65, p's.18). As reported for global viewing time measures, more time was spent looking
at faces that were selected (main effect of selection history: (F(1,28) = 78.34, p< .001) and at
studied associates of the visible scene cues (F(1,28) = 47.70, p< .001). This memory-based view-
ing effect was more robust when associates were correctly identified than they were not (selection
history x face type interaction: F(1,28) = 5.72, p = .02), but as can be seen in Fig 5B, differences
were in the expected direction whether or not associates were identified and selected. None of the
remaining main effects or interactions were statistically reliable (all F’s.1.38, p's.26).
ANOVAs calculated separately for selected faces (correctly identified associates and foils
selected in error) and faces that were not selected (associates that were not identified and foils
that were not selected) confirmed outcomes reported above. The only statistically reliable out-
come in both cases was a main effect of face type (F’s(1,28)21.21, p’s< .001), which was a
consequence of more time spent viewing associates than corresponding foils.
Disproportionate viewing of the correctly identified associates relative to faces selected in
error was expected to be evident shortly after display onset (i.e., between 500–750ms) for par-
ticipants assigned to both groups, an effect that would reflect memory for scene-face relation-
ships. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc comparisons indicated that there was significantly more
viewing directed to correctly identified associates than to faces selected in error for the experi-
mental group starting at 500–750ms (t(15) = 3.49, Bonferroni corrected p = .02, Cohen’s
d = 0.87). The same comparisons made for the control group indicated that disproportionate
viewing emerged slightly later in time (750–1000ms time bin: t(13) = 3.46, Bonferroni cor-
rected p = .03; Cohen’s d = 0.92; see Fig 5B). This is notable because there was no a priori rea-
son to expect the temporal onset of this effect to be different across groups–both groups had
the same encoding and explicit recognition test experiences. Potential explanations for this
unexpected outcome are considered in the discussion section. Evaluation of differences in the
amount of viewing time directed to associates that were not correctly identified vs. foils that
had not been selected indicated that effects were in the expected direction, but none of the indi-
vidual time bin contrasts survived correction for multiple comparisons (all t’s1.93, Bonfer-
roni corrected p’s.51). In sum, these results are largely consistent with past reports, but
also go further as most previous studies have not evaluated memory effects when explicit recog-
nition responses were incorrect (i.e. because recognition performance was near ceiling, but see
15).
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Post-Test: Assessment of Awareness
Having identified effects of memory on performance and viewing following the presentation of
subliminal scene cues, it is important to rule out the possibility that these effects were a conse-
quence of awareness. Results that address this concern are presented in the sections that follow.
Attention Task. Similar to the retrieval phase, compliance with attention task instructions
was generally good during the post-test–participants failed to make responses on just 4.40%
Fig 5. Explicit Memory-Based Viewing Effects. A) Proportion of total viewing time directed to faces of interest collapsed across the duration of the entire
test trial for the experimental group (top) and the control group (bottom). More time was spent viewing selected faces, and participants looked
disproportionately at the associates of scene cues whether explicit recognition responses were correct or not. B) Proportion of total viewing time directed to
faces of interest broken down into 250ms time bins starting with 3-face display onset. Selected faces were prioritized, and memory-based viewing that
distinguished correctly identified associates from faces selected in error were evident for both groups shortly after display onset. Error bars indicate standard
errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141677.g005
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(SD = 6.26) of the trials. For the remaining trials, successful detection/identification of horizon-
tal or vertical line segments embedded in the subliminal masking sequence was high and well-
matched across groups (Experimental Group: 83.30% correct, SD = 20.01; Control Group:
89.58%correct, SD = 11.77; t(37) = 1.02, p = .31; Cohen’s d = .38).
Subjective Awareness Assessment: Responses to the Post-Experiment Questionnaire.
None of the participants reported having seen anything suspicious in the masking sequence
when the first round of questions (e.g., did you notice any regularity in the noise while you
were performing the attention task) was administered. Following disclosure about the presence
of a scene in the masking sequence, a small subset of the participants indicated that they may
have caught glimpses of something in the noise sequence occasionally (Experimental
Group = 4 participants; Control Group = 5 participants), but none of them could provide reli-
able information about scene size, location, or content. Based on these outcomes, it seems rea-
sonable to conclude that participants remained unaware of the presence of a visual stimulus in
the masking sequence during the experiment proper.
Objective Awareness Assessment: 2-Alternative Forced-Choice Scene Identification.
Responses to the questions posed on the awareness questionnaire suggest that participants did
not suspect the presence of a scene cue in the subliminal masking sequence. As indicated
below, results from the objective test of awareness provide converging evidence for a lack of
awareness among experimental group participants.
Collapsed across groups, responses were not made on .55% (SD = 1.39) of the trials. After
these trials were eliminated, we found that scene identification was not better than chance for
participants assigned to the experimental group (51.80% correct, SD = 6.84; t(18) = 1.15, p =
.13); performance was, however, reliably greater than chance for the control group (57.33%
correct, SD = 9.89; t(19) = 3.31, p = .002; see Fig 6). Critically, the absence of above-chance per-
formance among participants assigned to the experimental group suggests that memory-based
viewing effects on the implicit test were unlikely to have been a consequence of conscious
awareness of the masked scene cue. As is evident in Fig 6, however, there was a range of
performance across individuals assigned to both groups. Additional analyses, reported in the
S1 Supplementary Materials, confirmed that even when participants identified as above-chance
performers (via binomial tests) were removed from the data set, effects of memory on eye
movement behavior following presentation of subliminal scene cues remained statistically
significant.
To determine whether or not recency of the encoding exposure had any effect on visibility
of masked scenes presented in the post-test, a between-groups repeated-measures ANOVA
with the factor block (blocks 1, 2, and 3) was calculated. Consistent with results reported above,
controls outperformed participants assigned to the experimental group on the forced-choice
identification test (F(1,37) = 4.13, p = .05). However, performance was not influenced by how
recently the scenes had been encoded (F(2,74) = .30, p = .75), nor were there differences
between groups in performance across blocks (F(2,74) = .22, p = .80). These results confirm
that pictures seen recently were not more easily identified than those seen early in the
experiment.
Linear Regression Analysis. Because a subset of the participants assigned to the experi-
mental group had performances on the awareness test that were numerically greater than
chance (see Fig 6), a procedure developed by Greenwald and colleagues [29] was used to deter-
mine whether or not implicit, memory-based viewing effects remained statistically reliable
when performance on the objective test of awareness was regressed to zero. To perform this
analysis, the magnitude of memory-based viewing effects were calculated for each participant,
restricted to two time bins of interest when viewing time differences were statistically reliable
on the implicit test (i.e. 1500–1750 and 1750–2000ms after display onset). This magnitude
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score was calculated by subtracting the proportion of viewing time directed to foil faces that
had not been selected from the proportion of viewing time directed to corresponding critical
faces (i.e. associates of the subliminal scene cue that had not been selected). A score equal to
zero would indicate no effect of memory on eye movement behavior. Pearson’s correlations
between the magnitude of memory-based viewing effects in each time bin and performance on
the objective 2-alternative forced-choice test of awareness (d’ scores) were calculated, and sim-
ple regression was used to determine whether or not the implicit viewing time outcome
remained statistically significant when post-test awareness was regressed to zero.
Initial tests indicated that there were no statistically reliable correlations between the
magnitude of the memory-based viewing effect and performance on the awareness test (1500–
1750ms Bin: r(18) = .18, p = .23; 1750–2000ms Bin: r(18) = .15, p = .27). Furthermore, results
from the linear regression analysis indicated that successful scene identification on the post-
test did not predict the magnitude of implicit eye-movement-based memory effects following
subliminal scene cues on the implicit test of memory (1500–1750ms Bin: slope = .14, t(18) =
.74, p = .47; 1750–2000ms Bin: slope = .17, t(18) = .64, p = .53). Finally, results indicated that
the y-intercept (i.e. magnitude of viewing) was reliably greater than zero for both time bins
(1500–1750ms Bin: y-axis intercept = .14, t(18) = 4.36, p = .001; 1750–2000ms Bin: y-axis inter-
cept = .12, t(18) = 2.76, p = .01), an outcome that indicates memory-based viewing effects were
not driven by low levels of awareness among a subset of participants assigned to the experi-
mental group.
Discussion
The current experiment was designed to address questions about whether or not memory for
arbitrary scene-face pairs, shown once each during encoding, can be retrieved following the
presentation of a subliminal scene cue. The combined use of subliminal masking procedures
Fig 6. Identification of Subliminal Scene Cues. A) Percentage of scenes that were correctly identified when the objective forced-choice test of scene
awareness was adminstered. Results from individual participants are superimposed on the bar graph (orange circles). B) Magnitude of the eye-movment-
based memory effects from the 1500–1750ms (left) and 1750–2000ms (right) time bins plotted as a function of post-test awareness (d’ scores). The
regression line for each comparison is superimposed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141677.g006
Subliminal Relational Memory
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0141677 October 29, 2015 19 / 27
and eye movement measures to investigate relational memory retrieval was a departure from
past work and meant that we could more effectively address questions about whether memory
can be expressed in button-press and/or eye movement behavior despite an absence of aware-
ness. Two primary outcomes suggested not only that subliminal scene cues were processed, but
that they triggered pattern completion processes that permit access to representations of
learned relationships. First, provided that pairs were successfully encoded, participants
assigned to the experimental group selected associates of corresponding subliminal scene cues
more often than would be expected by chance. This outcome is considered in light of additional
exploratory analyses in the text that follows. Second, following subliminal scene cues, partici-
pants assigned to the experimental group spent more time viewing non-selected associates
than non-selected comparison faces–an eye-movement-based relational memory effect that is
reported here for the first time using subliminal testing procedures. Neither outcome was sta-
tistically reliable among controls, which is to be expected, as the studied associates of sublimi-
nal scene cues were not present in the corresponding 3-face displays for this group. Consistent
with past reports [15] there was also evidence for memory-based viewing time differences
when participants made incorrect explicit recognition responses following visible scene cues.
Relative to comparison faces, participants from both groups spent more time looking at associ-
ates of visible scene cues; this effect was evident even when the associate was not successfully
identified as the match. Collectively, these outcomes provide additional converging evidence in
favor of the view that eye movements are a sensitive index of memory for studied materials
with and without concomitant awareness [12, 14, 24].
Control of scene cue visibility was achieved in this experiment with a masking sequence
developed by Henke and colleagues [42]. As in the experiment proper, all of the scenes pre-
sented on the objective test of awareness had been seen during the study phase, and results
indicated that there were no differences in accuracy as a function of the amount of time
between encoding and attempted identification of masked scenes. Critically, mean perfor-
mance of experimental group participants on this objective forced-choice identification test
was not better than chance. However, evaluation of Fig 6 shows that there was a range of per-
formance across participants, which hints at the possibility that memory outcomes on the
implicit test were a consequence of scene cue awareness among a small subset of our sample. It
is notable that before having been told about the presence of a scene in the masking sequence,
none of the participants reported having seen anything unusual or unexpected, but these sub-
jective measures are often described as insufficiently sensitive because participants may adopt
an overly strict criterion for reporting awareness [2]. On the other hand, above chance perfor-
mance on more objective tests (like the one used here) may not index conscious processes
selectively (i.e. there may be unconscious contamination) [28]. To address these issues, we used
a regression approach advocated by Greenwald and colleagues [29], and found that eye-move-
ment-based memory effects remained statistically reliable when performance on the awareness
test was regressed to zero. Furthermore, and as reported in the S1 Supplementary Materials,
eye-movement-based implicit relational memory effects remained statistically reliable even
when individual above-chance performers were removed from the data set. Collectively then,
these outcomes provide strong evidence against the view that conscious identification of the
scene cue was driving the reported memory outcomes.
Whether or not other factors might be contributing to reported results was also given due
consideration, and indeed, it was discovered that the implicit “memory” effect in back-sorted
behavioral data may have been a consequence of selection bias evident in the button-press
responses of both groups. That another factor might be contributing to the reported outcome
was suggested by control group performance. Controls were marginally more likely to select
critical faces from implicit test displays when data were back-sorted as a function of explicit
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recognition accuracy despite the fact that these faces were not associates of subliminal scene
cues. Counterbalancing procedures and follow-up analyses ruled out potential perceptual or
location-based influences on reported outcomes, but further analyses did reveal a slight bias
among participants assigned to both groups to choose the same face from corresponding
implicit and explicit test displays. Of course, it is ideal to make the same response if the face
that happened to have been selected was the associate of the visible scene cue presented subse-
quently, but this bias was evident irrespective of explicit recognition accuracy. It seems then,
that when participants were unsure about the identity of the associate, they were sometimes
inclined to simply make the same response that had been given previously. It is important to
note that this slight response repetition bias had a small impact on explicit recognition memory
performance, but that recognition performance was well above-chance for both groups even
when all of the repeated responses were eliminated from analyses. Furthermore, the same fac-
tor could not have been influencing the reported implicit eye-movement-based memory effect
because this data was not back-sorted based on explicit recognition performance, memory-
based viewing effects were documented for critical faces that had not been selected (and there-
fore, were not associated with a button-press response), and controls showed absolutely no
preference for critical faces (over foils) in patterns of viewing.
A skeptic might argue that the scene identification approach used to assess awareness in our
study was not maximally sensitive, and while that may indeed be the case, we would argue that
it was optimally sensitive given the objectives of this investigation. When the post-test was
administered, participants were instructed to identify the scene that they felt had been pre-
sented in the subliminal masking sequence, guessing if necessary. A more conservative test
might have used masking sequences that contained embedded scenes on just half of the trials,
and required participants to make a presence/absence decision subsequent to each display.
Here, we chose not to use the more conservative test because the ability to distinguish scene
presence from absence can be supported by low level sensory information (e.g. luminance
changes) that is not diagnostic of scene identity. Indeed, if conscious access to low level percep-
tual factors was sufficient to drive statistically reliable outcomes on the implicit test, then this
should also permit successful scene identification on the forced-choice awareness test when
participants are deliberately attempting to use any information in the masking sequence to sup-
port correct responses [6]. Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that the awareness test was actually
too liberal, as it was quite different from implicit test itself. Successful identification of masked
scenes on the awareness test could be realized consequent to a simple feature-based matching
strategy–participants could compare a line segment, seen in the masking sequence, to the visi-
ble scene exemplars and make a reasonable guess about scene identity as a consequence. The
same strategy was unlikely to be effective, or even employed, during performance of the
implicit test because a simple line segment is unlikely to permit conscious recall of the corre-
sponding scene (from a very large set) and subsequent conscious recovery of information
about the associated face. Furthermore, this kind of complex strategy was unlikely to have been
used, as participants reported that they were unaware of scene presence on the subjective
assessment of awareness. A potential control that could be used in future studies might simply
be to change the instruction on the implicit test and ask participants to look at the face they
believe was the associate of the subliminally presented scene cue. In this case, participants
would know about the presence of the scene, and would attempt to access and use that infor-
mation to drive viewing behavior. If the reported eye-movement-based memory effects are best
characterized as unconscious or unaware, then the pattern observed here should be absent or
qualitatively different when participants are given explicit viewing instructions [43].
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that several research investigations indicate that
scene gist can be recovered very quickly after stimulus onset [44], although recent studies
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suggest that early access may be limited to superordinate information (e.g. whether scene con-
tent is natural or manmade) [45, 46]. Based on these reports, it is possible that participants
would have succeeded on an awareness test at the level of superordinate categorization (e.g.
indoor/outdoor discrimination), but again, access to this kind of information is insufficient to
support conscious retrieval of specific pairs of studied associates. In sum, questions about
whether or not awareness has been completely eliminated are challenging to address, and con-
tinue to be a source of considerable debate [3], but here we have demonstrated that even when
awareness is minimized, relational memory effects can be documented in eye movement
behavior. The methodological approach used here was more conservative than in past studies
[20, 24], but the general conclusions remain the same.
While the results described above were generally consistent with our expectations, not all of
the predicted outcomes were confirmed, and some of the results were surprising. In contrast to
expectations, experimental group participants did not make faster responses when they hap-
pened to have selected the associates of subliminal scene cues, and viewing was not directed
disproportionately to selected associates following subliminal scene cues relative to other
selected faces. Instead, the opposite viewing pattern was observed for a brief time after display
onset (i.e. from 250–500ms after display onset). It is possible that this outcome reflects some
degree of unconscious uncertainty about the choice that would ultimately be made, but this
result should be considered with caution as the group interaction was not statistically signifi-
cant. In addition, an unexpected, but potentially interesting outcome was a slight difference in
the onset of eye-movement-based relational memory effects between groups when memory
was tested explicitly. Participants assigned to the experimental group showed standard dispro-
portionate viewing of correctly identified associates that was evident within 500–750ms of dis-
play onset [16, 41]. The same difference was not statistically reliable in control data until 750–
1000ms, and even then evaluation of Fig 5 suggests that the effect was driven primarily by a
decrease in viewing directed to foil faces selected in error, rather than increased prioritization
of correctly identified associates. Potential explanations for all of these outcomes are consid-
ered in the text that follows.
First, we consider predicted outcomes that were not confirmed. Past studies indicate that
subliminal encoding can influence the speed of subsequent decision making when studied
materials are presented for conscious inspection [31, 32, 47]. As indicated in the introduction,
when participants correctly guess the occupational category of a face following subliminal
encoding, they respond more quickly than when their guesses are incorrect. Here, there was no
evidence for a difference in the efficiency of responses on the implicit test as a function of
whether or not experimental group participants happened to select the associate following sub-
liminal scene cues. While this may seem surprising, response time differences have not always
been evaluated in subliminal encoding investigations [35, 36] and in some cases, statistically
reliable outcomes consistent with learning have not been observed [42]. It is possible then that
the response time effect is subject to specific testing conditions or experimental procedures,
which makes it difficult to replicate. In support of this possibility, reported response time dif-
ferences during test can vary as a function of the speed with which line segments are detected
during performance of the attention task (i.e. when subliminal stimulus materials are pre-
sented) [47] and as a function of event structure [33]. Additional experiments are needed to
identify the factors that determine whether and under what circumstances response time dif-
ferences occur.
In addition to the lack of response time effects, predicted differences in the amount of view-
ing time directed to selected associates of subliminal scene cues did not materialize. Instead,
viewing patterns were dominated by the act of selection itself. Any face that happened to have
been selected drew the most viewing, whether that face was the associate of the subliminal
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scene cue or not. This selection effect was evident shortly after 3-face display onset and
remained robust for the duration of the test trial. One potential explanation for this outcome is
that the act of selection (required by our instructional manipulation) trumps memory-based
viewing of associates that happened to have been selected when participants do not see the
scene cues. While similar selection effects were apparent following visible scene cues, there was
also clear differentiation between correctly identified associates and faces that were selected in
error. This eye-movement-based relational memory effect likely reflects some combination of
successful retrieval, which drives viewing to the associate, and uncertainty that accompanies
incorrect responses (but see [13]); participants may fixate associates disproportionately when
they are retrieved successfully (see [48] for such outcomes with single item test displays) and
distribute viewing to other non-selected items in the display (e.g., especially the unidentified
associate) when explicit retrieval is not diagnostic. The same kind of deliberation would not be
expected following subliminal scene cues when participants are not instructed explicitly to
identify the match. More generally, the selection effect that dominates viewing following pre-
sentation of subliminal scene cues may have delayed preferential viewing of associates that
were not selected (i.e. the subliminal eye-movement-based memory effect described above).
Disproportionate viewing of these faces emerged within 1500–1750ms of display presentation,
which is 1000ms slower than standard preferential viewing effects (associated with visible
scene cues and correct recognition responses) that have been documented in several past stud-
ies [15, 16, 41], and are seen here among experimental group participants. Notably though, this
delayed time-course is consistent with results of one previous investigation [15]. In that study
data were subdivided into 1000ms bins following display onset, and memory-based viewing of
associates was evident from 1000–2000ms when explicit recognition responses were incorrect.
So, results here provide converging evidence in favor of a slightly delayed time-course of pref-
erential viewing when participants cannot explicitly identify associates of scene cues. In short,
when participants remain unaware of scene cues, the immediacy of the selection requirements
based on the instructional manipulation may override, curtail, or delay expressions of memory
in eye movement behavior, and minimize exploratory search of display elements. This possibil-
ity could be evaluated in a future study that eliminates the directive to select a face when 3-face
displays follow subliminal scene cues.
One final outcome that is notable concerns a slight difference in the latency of the eye-
movement-based relational memory effect between groups on the explicit test. As indicated
above, disproportionate viewing of correctly identified associates was delayed among control
group participants. It is difficult to draw strong conclusions about this difference in the onset
of preferential viewing as there was not a statistically reliable 3-way interaction of group, face
type, and time bin; however, we do suggest two potential explanations that could be evaluated
in a follow-up investigation provided that the effect can be replicated and a statistically reliable
interaction be documented. One possibility is that the difference in time-course is a conse-
quence of priming among experimental group participants, who were exposed to the same
scene cue twice, once subliminally and then again supraliminally. However, a priming effect
seems unlikely, as disproportionate viewing developed within 500–750ms of 3-face display
onset as has been reported in the past [16]. Alternatively, it may be the case that interference
between subliminal and visible scene cues, which were different studied scenes for control
group participants, slowed allocation of attention and eye movements to correctly identified
associates when 3-face displays followed visible scene cues. Similar interference has been
reported using response time measures when participants are asked to indicate whether a visi-
ble digit, preceded by a masked prime, is less than or greater than 5. When masked primes had
semantic identities that were incongruent with the visible target (e.g., a masked 3 followed by a
visible 7), response time costs were evident in behavioral responses [6]. This outcome suggests
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that participants have unconsciously applied the instruction to the prime itself. Consistent with
this possibility, the same group has demonstrated, using event-related potentials, that primes
were analyzed up to the level of motor response preparation that was consistent with the
instructional manipulation [49]. Extending this observation to findings reported here, it is pos-
sible that presentation of the subliminal scene cue triggered unconscious retrieval of the associ-
ated face, and that this representation interfered with rapid retrieval of the correct associate
when visible scene cues were presented subsequently. Again, this is a question that requires fur-
ther evaluation. One possibility is that the 3-face test display interposed between subliminal
and supraliminal scene cues attenuated the interference effect; the time-course difference may
therefore be more robust if the initial 3-face display was removed from the trial structure.
Finally, it is worth speculating about the neural correlates of subliminal memory-based
viewing effects that were documented in this experiment. It is well established that the hippo-
campus and adjacent medial temporal lobe cortical structures are critical for long-term declara-
tive (i.e. consciously accessible) memory [50] but there is also growing support for the view
that the hippocampus is best characterized by its role in relational memory binding, irrespec-
tive of awareness [37, 51]. Indeed, the task used here was adapted from previous studies that
have addressed questions about the dependence of eye-movement-based relational memory
effects on the hippocampus [15, 16]. These studies have shown that patients with hippocampal
damage fail to show any evidence for relational memory in eye movement behavior, even when
explicit identification of the matching face happens to have been correct, and that activity dif-
ferences in the hippocampus predict early disproportionate viewing among neurologically
intact individuals, even when explicit recognition responses are incorrect. It seems reasonable,
based on these reported outcomes and the proposed role of the hippocampus in relational
memory binding and retrieval [52, 53], that the memory-based viewing patterns observed here
subsequent to subliminal scene cue presentations are supported by the hippocampus. This
could be tested in future work that combines fMRI and eye tracking methods.
In sum, the results reported here provide new insight into the nature and type of representa-
tional content that can be recovered and accessed despite an absence of awareness. To date,
much of the work that has evaluated unconscious processing has used overlearned materials
with which participants have considerable experience, and tasks require semantic decisions
(e.g., words, digits [5, 7, 8], but see [54]). Here, we have demonstrated that memory for arbi-
trarily paired scenes and faces, presented just once during encoding, can be accessed and influ-
ence eye movement behavior when scene cues are presented subliminally. That eye movements
can be affected by subliminal stimulus exposure has been documented in at least one other
investigation. In that experiment, subliminal presentation of objects influenced the efficiency
of subsequent change detection performance [55]. Results showed that gaze was attracted more
quickly to the location of the change when the subliminal object was the search target than
when it was a distractor. This experiment illustrates the utility of gaze analysis in subliminal
research studies, but results reported here go further because a direct perceptual match between
the subliminal stimulus and items in the test display were not driving reported outcomes.
Implicit memory effects were not forthcoming in button-press response data (i.e. selection of
the critical face or response time differences). This outcome is consistent with the view that eye
movements, which permit moment-to-moment evaluation of data, may represent a more sen-
sitive index of past experience than discrete button-press responses and subjective reports [12].
It is possible that our instructions (i.e. a test of foresight) or the relatively lengthy duration of
3-face displays (i.e. 5 seconds) obviated any implicit memory effects that might otherwise have
been observed in the button-press response data–this is something that could be addressed in
future research. That said, the eye movement results were robust, stood up to several additional
exploratory analyses, and are informative on their own.
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